

## **Supplemental Information**



January 9, 2008

### Safe Harbor Disclosure

This presentation and our remarks may contain forward-looking statements. Important factors such as general market conditions and the competitive environment could cause actual results to differ materially from those projected in these forward-looking statements. Risk factors are detailed in our 10K, which is available on our website, www.mbia.com. The company undertakes no obligation to revise or update any forward-looking statements to reflect changes in events or expectations.

In addition, the definitions of the non-GAAP terms that are included in this presentation may be found on our website at www.mbia.com.




### MBIA's Insured Portfolio is Large and Diverse

### Total of \$673 billion Net Par Outstanding as of 9/30/07

## \$432.7 billion Public Finance Insured Portfolio Percent of Net Par Outstanding by Bond Type

# General Obligation, 39% Sovereign/Sub Sovereign, 3% Housing, 4% Investor-Owned Utilities, 3% Higher Education, 6% Transportation, 10% Special Revenue, 11% Health Care, 6%

## \$240.2 billion Structured Finance Insured Portfolio Percent of Net Par Outstanding by Bond Type





### Market Dislocation Has Impacted Our Insured Portfolio

### Mortgage market disruption

- Increasing delinquencies and defaults on mortgages are impacting our RMBS and ABS CDO portfolios causing us to increase loss reserves
- MTM losses resulting from market disruption are not economic in the absence of credit impairments
- Rating agency capital charges have gone up and we have increased our expectation of credit losses in the stress scenarios

### 2007 operating results will be impacted

- Case reserves related to prime second-lien RMBS portfolio estimated at \$614 million
- MTM loss at \$3.3 billion: \$3.1 billion non-economic and \$200 million credit impairment associated with CDS contracts/CDOs
- Increase in unallocated case reserve by \$100 million

### MBIA's capital plan

- Exceeds all rating agencies Triple-A requirements
- Creates "dry powder" to capitalize on new business opportunities



### **Credit Road Map: RMBS and Multi-Sector CDOs**

RMBS	Net Par (\$Bn)	Comment
Subprime	\$4.7	•High quality, Triple-A only since 2004
Prime First Mortgage	17.8	Mostly European Triple-A
HELOC	11.7	Performing below expectation
Closed-End Seconds	11.1	Performing below expectation
Total RMBS	\$45.2 Bn	Increase in loss reserve of \$614mm on HELOC and Closed-End Seconds


Multi Sector CDOs	Net Par (\$Bn)	Comment
High Grade	\$16.1	•High quality, low risk book
Mezzanine	3.7	•Only 1 US deal written since 2004
Secondary Market	1.8	Diversified across 2000-2004 origination
CDOs of CDOs	9.0	•70% of collateral Triple-A rated with 41% originated 2005 or prior •\$200mm impairment in portfolio
Total Multi-Sector CDO	\$30.6 Bn	



### **MBIA's RMBS Exposure**


### RMBS exposure comprises 7% of insured portfolio as of 9/30/07

### \$45.2 billion of RMBS Exposure



### **Closed-End Seconds / HELOCs by Vintage**

	\$ bn	%
2005 and Prior	5.3	23%
2006	8.4	37%
2007	9.1	40%
Total	22.8	100%





# Prime HELOC and Closed-End Seconds Portfolio More Exposed

- Total HELOC and Closed-End Seconds Portfolio of \$22.8bn
- MBIA identified several HELOC and Closed-End Seconds deals totaling \$9.5bn of net par outstanding performing below expectations
  - Defaults consumed excess spread and overcollateralization
  - "Layered" risk unexpectedly increased
    - Low documentation (i.e. limited income/employment verification)
    - High Combined Loan to Value (CLTV)
    - Negative Home Price Appreciation (HPA) environment)
    - Speculation
- MBIA has announced loss reserves of \$614 million
- MBIA has paid \$46 million of claims so far



### **Multi-Sector CDOs**

### **Structural protections include:**

- Most senior position
- Full control rights within the deal documentation
- Interest coverage and overcollateralization tests (funded deals)
- Collateral portfolio quality tests (managed deals)
- Events of default (including par based OC tests)
  - Collateral manager termination and replacement rights
  - Acceleration and liquidation of collateral fully in control of MBIA

### In the event of impairment, our CDOs have one of the three payout patterns:


- Principal only or capped—\$4.3bn
- Scheduled interest and ultimate principal \$18.2bn
- Credit events as they occur- \$8.1bn



### Typical Multi-Sector High Grade CDO Exposure Losses

## \$1 billion CDO, with \$1 billion in High Grade Collateral.

MBIA wrapped top 85%, most senior tranche



## Hypothetical Collateral Loss Assumptions

 15% loss, less average 10% overcollateralization

$$-(15\% - 10\%) \times 30\% = 1.5\%$$

 15% loss less, average 10% overcollateralization

$$-(15\% - 10\%) \times 20\% = 1.0\%$$

 49% loss of CDO collateral (70% loss of ABS CDOs)

Total loss of 12.3% is below MBIA's 15% attachment point.




### **CDOs of CDOs Exposure**

- 9 transactions, \$9bn in total
- 70% of the underlying collateral rated Triple-A
- Subordination = 12% on average
- \$200 million of credit impairment

### By collateral type

# CDOs of ABS, 20% Investment Grade Corporate, 2% Other ABS, 2% Other, 1% RMBS, 12%

#### By vintage of underlying collateral





### **Rating Agency Capital Position**

### Estimating *capital requirements* based on hypothetical:

- "worst case" ratings downgrades
- "worst case" economic losses

### "Forward looking" analyses incorporate future stress

- S&P using 40% and 16% cumulative net loss (CNL) for Prime/Closed-End Seconds (CES) mortgages and HELOCs
- Moody's using 19% CNL for subprime first mortgages
- Fitch "downgrading" all current CDO collateral 6 to 9 additional notches



### Rating Agency Capital Position- After Stress Analysis

### Post re-rating & stress analysis: Capital Shortfall as of 9/30/07

(\$ in billions) \$2.5 \$2.0 \$2.0 \$1.4 \$1.5 \$1.0 \$0.5 \$0.0 Low High



# Loss Reserve/Credit Impairment versus Capital Requirement

	P&L Impact	Reflection of Expected Losses	Reason for Capital Raise
Loss reserves     (expected losses in insured portfolio)	✓	✓	No
2. Mark-to-Market (a) (with credit impairment)	✓	<b>✓</b>	No
3. Mark-to-Market (b)  (non-economic; will reverse to zero as bonds approach maturity)	✓	No	No
4. Capital Requirement (Stress scenario – worst case loss in a 1 in 10,000 loss stress case plus 30% added cushion)	No	No	✓



# Capital Plan Exceeds Rating Agencies' Capital Requirement

Common Equity	\$1,000 million	Warburg Pincus Commitment & Backstopped Rights Offering
Debt	\$1,000 million	To be Completed
Q4 2007 Roll-off Of Back Book	\$300- \$500 million	Net maturities, amortization
Reinsurance Benefit	\$50- \$150 million	Covering diversified portions of our portfolio

**Total** \$2,350- \$2,650 million

MBIA has also announced a 62% dividend cut



### **The Warburg Pincus Commitment**

### **Announced December 10, 2007**

### Two "tranches"

- \$500 million common equity investment @\$31 per share
- \$500 million commitment to backstop a rights offering to existing shareholders

### Firm commitment


- No "outs" for rating agency outcomes or MAC
- No bring-down of reps and warranties

### **Expected closing dates**

- First \$500 million to close upon HSR and FSA approvals approximately late January
- Rights offering expected to close in February



# Estimated "Excess Capital" Position After Capital Plan Completion as of 12/31/2007



The capital plan will increase MBIA's total claims-paying resources from \$14.2bn at 09/30/2007 to at least \$16.2bn proforma at 12/31/2007.



### **Current Market Trends Play to MBIA's Strengths**

## Demand for financial guarantee insurance is expected to rebound

- Credit market disruptions have reinforced the need for financial guarantees
- Public finance and global infrastructure finance needs are growing
  - Resilience of demand for the municipal bond insurance industry
- Structured finance market is expected to recover from the dislocation

### Market conditions are attractive

- Wider spreads and increased overcollateralization are creating significantly higher ROE on new business
- Competitive dynamics in the industry are shifting
- Underwriting can be more selective

MBIA remains well positioned in this market.



### **Core Business Opportunities are Robust**

### **Public Finance**

- Risk-adjusted pricing is improving
- Public finance needs in the U.S. are expected to grow
- Privatization of essential infrastructure projects globally continues to present attractive opportunities

### **Structured Finance**

- Insured volume will be very low in the first half of 2008
- Minimal impact on revenue due to long tail nature of business
- As structured finance market rebuilds, MBIA will play a key role resulting in new opportunities at attractive prices





